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GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN GOVERNANCE: 
THE SEARCH FOR ‘WHAT WORKS’  
ANDREAS RÜHMKORF∗ 
This article critically discusses the developing legislative framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in global supply chains in the ‘home 
states’ of transnational corporations, that is, the countries where these 
companies are incorporated and have their headquarters. The article focuses 
on the interaction of private and public governance by examining how 
legislation can steer companies’ use of private CSR instruments such as 
Codes of Conduct. Following a critical review of empirical data relating to 
the Supplier Codes of Conduct of the top 30 listed German companies 
(DAX30), recent examples of ‘home state’ legislation of CSR are assessed. 
The article shows that most of these laws are not very stringent. The article 
argues that a hybrid regulatory approach towards CSR in global supply 
chains is necessary. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is currently a much-debated topic and a 
pressing issue for global supply chains. However, whereas global supply chains 
have been a traditional subject of research in disciplines such as management 
and political sciences, their analysis within legal studies is more recent. The 
traditional absence of legal research in this area means that legal perspectives 
play a limited role within debates about promoting greater CSR in global supply 
chains. This is surprising, given that contracts are at the very heart of relations 
between the different actors in supply chains and given that legislation already 
requires companies to report on their activities. 
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This article will contribute to the developing discussion about the role of law in 
promoting greater supply chain responsibility. It will focus on the interaction 
between private and public governance of CSR, that is, the way in which 
legislation in the so-called ‘home states’ of transnational corporations steers 
those companies’ pursuit of CSR in their private governance relations with their 
suppliers. The article will critically analyse different approaches to public 
governance that are currently being used to direct transnational corporations 
towards accepting greater corporate responsibility.  
The article is structured in the following way. It first highlights the limited role 
that legal perspectives have so far played in the literature on supply chain 
governance. The article then analyses empirical data relating to the Supplier 
Codes of Conduct of the top 30 listed German companies (DAX30). The data 
show that there are significant deficiencies in the approach of those leading 
listed companies towards CSR in their supply chain. These findings support the 
view that legal intervention is needed. The article then critically assesses recent 
examples of home state legislation passed with the intention of promoting CSR 
in global supply chains. The article argues that most of these laws fall short of 
steering the behaviour of corporations towards greater promotion of CSR in 
their private governance schemes. It makes the case for a hybrid regulatory 
approach towards CSR in global supply chains and concludes by making some 
tentative suggestions for the design of such an approach. It argues that 
discussions about greater supply chain responsibility now need to focus on the 
question ‘what works?’ 
II THEORY: THE LIMITED ROLE OF LAW IN GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAIN GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVES 
In general, a supply chain (also referred to as a ‘value chain’, particularly in 
management studies) consists of the parties that contribute to the product which 
is sold to the customer. It therefore encompasses the seller of the product as 
well as the manufacturer, retailers, transporters and sub-suppliers.1 A global 
supply chain is a supply chain that extends over different countries. Many 
supply chains consist of different levels of suppliers, but the complexity of the 
chain can differ significantly according to the industry and country of 
production.  
In the past two decades, global supply chains have, repeatedly, been in the 
public spotlight for allegations of gross violation of CSR principles. Examples 
                                                 
1 Sunil Chopra and Peter Meindl, Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and Operation 
(Pearson Publishing, 5th ed, 2013) 13.  
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of industry sectors that have been criticised for violations of CSR principles 
include the electronics industry (for example, in its use of forced labour),2 the 
chocolate industry (in its use of child labour)3 and the textile industry (in its 
breaches of health and safety standards).4 
A Theories of Supply Chain Governance 
The planning and management of the activities that are part of the chain — such 
as sourcing, procurement and logistics — fall into the domain of supply chain 
management.5 And this is, in turn, closely linked to the issue of supply chain 
governance. The term ‘governance’ is widely used in a number of different 
disciplines and different definitions are used even in different sub-fields of 
political science.6 For the purpose of this article, governance is defined as ‘the 
setting and management of the political rules of the game, and, more 
substantially, with a search for control, steering and accountability’.7 The term 
is generally used to refer to the different methods of steering used by state and 
non-state actors.8  
A distinction can be made between private and public governance. Vogel 
defines private governance (which he calls ‘civil regulation’) as involving 
‘private, non-state or market-based regulatory frameworks’ which ‘govern 
multinational firms and global supply networks’.9 Characteristic of this kind of 
governance is its soft-law nature and the absence of public intervention in its 
processes.10 Codes of conduct are the most prominent form of private voluntary 
                                                 
2 Kate Hodal and Annie Kelly, ‘Malaysia: Forced Labour Casts Dark Shadow over Electronics 
Industry’, The Guardian (online) 21 November 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/nov/21/malaysia-forced-labour-casts-dark-shadow-over-electronics-
industry>. 
3 Emiko Terazono, ‘Chocolate Industry Accused of Failure on Child Labour’, The Financial 
Times (online) 18 April 2018 <https://www.ft.com/content/eb58ba84-425f-11e8-803a-
295c97e6fd0b>. 
4 Hannah Murphy, ‘Concerns Rise for Wellbeing of Staff in Global Supply Chains’, The 
Financial Times (online) 13 September 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/3dca3f82-3fa9-
11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58>. 
5 Robert M Monczka et al, Purchasing and Supply Chain Management (South-Western, 4th ed, 
2009) 6. 
6 Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Polity Press, 2004) 4. 
7 Ibid 11. 
8 Reinhard Steurer, ‘Disentangling Governance: A Synoptic View of Regulation by Government, 
Business and Civil Society’ (2013) 46 Policy Science 387, 388.  
9 David Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’ (2010) 49 Business and 
Society 68, 69. 
10 Luc Fransen and Brian Burgoon, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Public and Private Labor 
Standards Policy in the Global Economy’ (2017) 8 (S3) Global Policy 5, 7. 
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regulation, as well as, for example, the standards set by best practices, 
certifications and labels.11 Regulation can be understood as ‘all mechanisms of 
social control or influence affecting behaviour from whatever source, whether 
intentional or not’.12 As labels can influence the decision-making process of 
consumers (for example, consumers might decide to purchase a product that is 
labelled as being made without slave labour) they can affect behaviour and are 
therefore a form of regulation. 
Unlike private governance, public governance is exerted by public actors, 
including governments at various levels within nation-states, and supranational 
organisations and, in the context of global value chains, also bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements.13 Public governance in the form of government 
regulation is often mandatory, albeit with varying degrees of design and 
enforcement, depending on the respective country.14 The concepts of private 
and public governance are related to private and public regulation and, actually, 
appear to be used almost interchangeably in parts of the literature.15  
The most prominent theoretical conceptualisation of the governance of global 
supply chains can be found in the global value chain (GVC) theory.16 This  
theory has, traditionally, concentrated its analysis on the relationship between 
                                                 
11 Russell W Mills, ‘The Interaction of Private and Public Regulatory Governance: The Case of 
Association-Led Voluntary Aviation Safety Programs’ (2016) 35 Policy and Society 43. The 
literature has extensively studied the rise of private CSR standards, their design and governance 
structures. See for an overview David J Vogel, ‘Private Global Business Regulation’ (2008) 11 
Annual Rev Political Science 261. See also the conceptual map by Abbott and Snidal with its 
‘governance triangle’ that distinguishes between three major actors — the state, companies and 
non-governmental organisations which develop rules and standards, either separately or 
together: Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory 
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State’ in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), 
The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 50. 
12 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a Post-Regulatory World’ (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems 103, 129. 
13 G Gereffi and Joonkoo Lee, ‘Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Value Chains and 
Industrial Clusters: Why Governance Matters’ (2016) 133(1) Journal of Business Ethics 25, 31.  
14 Ibid. 
15 See, for example, the analysis in Mills, above n 11. 
16 See Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value 
Chains’ (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78; Gary Gereffi, ‘Global 
Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World’ (2014) 21(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 9. See also, for a discussion of this theoretical conceptualisation in the 
context of CSR and law, Andreas Rühmkorf, ‘From Transparency to Due Diligence Laws? 
Variations in Stringency of CSR Regulation in Global Supply Chains in the “Home State” of 
Multinational Enterprises’ in Jean J du Plessis, Umakanth Varottil and Jeroen Veldman (eds), 
Globalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility and its Impact on Corporate Governance 
(Springer, 2018) 177. 
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corporate buyers and their suppliers and the creation of value in those chains.17 
Its main focus has been on: 1) The use of power by lead firms (that is, the buyers 
at the top of the chain which include the Western transnational corporations), 
and 2) economic upgrading (that is, the move to higher value activities in 
production, improved technology, knowledge, skills and increased profits).18 
However, ‘upgrading’ is now also understood to include social upgrading, 
which means that CSR can be included in the governance analysis of GVC 
theory.19 This is an important development, given how influential GVC theory 
is for the discourse about global supply chains. Under this broader 
understanding of upgrading, CSR is considered to be part of ‘synergistic 
governance’ where private governance, social governance and public 
governance interact.  
A further approach to theorising the governance of supply chains can be found 
in global production network (GPN) theory which takes a broader perspective 
than GVC theory as it also takes into account the impact that a range of different 
stakeholders have on the running of those chains and relationships within 
them.20  
B A Role for Law in Supply Chain Analysis 
At present, legal perspectives are not at the centre of either theory. They have 
been effectively marginalised since the study of supply chain governance was, 
and in many ways still is, primarily seen as an issue for management studies 
and political sciences. One of the main reasons why law has played such a 
limited role in the governance analysis of CSR is the view that, through global 
                                                 
17 See Gary Gereffi, ‘Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World’ (2014) 
21(1)  Review of International Political Economy 9, 12. 
18 See Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, above n 16, 85. 
19 Gereffi and Lee, above n 13, 29. Barrientos notes that a GPN perspective would facilitate 
‘examination of the social and institutional embeddedness of commercial operations’: 
Stephanie Ware Barrientos, ‘“Labour Chains”: Analysing the Role of Labour Contractors in 
Global Production Networks’ (2013) 49 The Journal of Development Studies 1058, 1065.  
20 Jeffrey Henderson et al, ‘Global Production Networks and the Analysis of Economic 
Development’ (2002) 9 Review of International Political Economy 436; Neil M Coe, Peter 
Dicken and Martin Hess, ‘Global Production Networks: Realizing the Potential’ (2008) 8 
Journal of Economic Geography 271. For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to 
adopt either of the two frameworks as the article focuses on the steering of corporate behaviour 
through public regulation which is an issue that can be encompassed by both framings. Bair and 
Palpacuer note that ‘the distinction between the GVC and GPN approaches as theoretical 
frameworks is overdrawn and its implications for empirical work overstated.’ See Jennifer Bair 
and Florence Palpacuer, ‘CSR beyond the Corporation: Contested Governance in Global Value 
Chains’ (2015) 15 Global Networks 1, 4. 
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supply chains, transnational corporations are not only able to outsource their 
production, but also their legal liability.21 It is argued that there is a ‘governance 
gap’ which allows transnational corporations at the top of global supply chains 
to operate with impunity whilst core CSR principles such as human rights are 
violated in their supply chains.22 This argument is based on legal concepts and 
principles such as the territoriality of the law and the low legal standards or 
weak enforcement systems in the countries where the production sites are 
located (the so-called ‘host states’).  
However, whilst there are, in fact, significant barriers to holding the 
transnational corporation at the top of the chain legally accountable, it would 
be wrong to argue therefore that law has no role to play in the analysis of such 
chains. Quite to the contrary, law — specifically contract law — is central to 
the very existence of supply chains. It provides the tools that the parties 
operating in those chains use to construct their legal relations. The fact that law 
has, so far, been marginalised in the analysis of supply chain theories was 
recently criticised by the Institute for Global Law and Policy and Global 
Production Working Group.23 This marginalisation needs to change, however, 
as law plays an increasing role in the governance of CSR in global supply 
chains, for example through the legislative requirement that companies report 
on CSR issues such as modern slavery.24 
The increasingly prominent law in this area has been referred to as ‘chain 
law’.25 Chain law needs to be better recognised and further developed since law 
has much potential to provide tools to embed CSR into supply chain relations 
through a variety of regulatory techniques. These techniques range from 
disclosure laws to more traditional ‘command and control’-type regulation.  
                                                 
21 See Andreas Rühmkorf, ‘Global Sourcing through Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers: 
Challenges for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Alice de Jonge and Roman Tomasic (eds), 
Research Handbook on Transnational Corporations (Edward Elgar, 2017) 198. 
22 See for the ‘governance gap’: Luc Fransen and Brian Burgoon, ‘A Market for Worker Rights: 
Explaining Business Support for International Private Labour Regulation’ (2012) 19 Review of 
International Political Economy 236. 
23 The IGLP and Global Production Working Group, ‘The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: 
A Research Manifesto’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 57. 
24 See Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rühmkorf, ‘Steering CSR through Home State 
Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on 
Global Supply Chain Governance’ (2017) 8 (S3) Global Policy 15. 
25 Bertram Teubner, ‘Supply-Chain Legal Pluralism: Normativity as Constitutive of Chain 
Infrastructure in the Moroccan Argan Oil Supply Chain’ (2016) 48 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 378, 386. 
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The previously limited role of legal contributions to debates on supply chain 
responsibility has a further explanation. The engagement of Western 
transnational corporations with CSR in their global supply chain was, and still 
is, largely based on private governance mechanisms which are characterised by 
their voluntariness and soft law character. In consequence, the governance of 
CSR within supply chains often still tends to be seen not as a legal issue, but 
rather as one that is at the discretion of the individual companies. 
It is therefore necessary that the discussions about CSR in global supply chains 
now focus on the role and potential of law as an instrument to be used in 
promoting greater CSR in the supply chains of transnational corporations. Such 
an approach would recognise that the so-called lead firms have much 
bargaining power and that they can use this power to impose more 
responsibility on their supply chain. The argument of the research manifesto, 
referred to above, that ‘law resides at the heart of the GVC phenomenon’ is 
therefore fully supported here.26 
The developing legal regulation of CSR in global supply chains by the home 
states of transnational corporations has consequences also for another strand of 
the literature — the discourse about the interaction between public and private 
governance.27 It is argued by some that private and public governance can be 
seen as substitutes for each other, with private regulation being used to displace 
public regulation.28 Others argue that these two governance spheres can 
complement each other.29 Irrespective of that controversy, the literature on the 
interaction of public and private governance in supply chains acknowledges 
that the role of the state in this context remains ‘largely underdeveloped’30 and 
that there is a need for some form of state intervention to steer private 
governance. Commentators refer to a ‘multifaceted approach’, combining 
public with private governance.31 
It is argued in this article that, in the context of CSR in global supply chains, it 
is now important to study in detail the different ways in which state-based 
                                                 
26 See the IGLP and Global Production Working Group, above n 23, 61. 
27 See, for example, Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’, above n 9, 
82; Kate Macdonald, The Politics of Global Supply Chains (Polity Press, 2014) 182; Richard 
M Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global 
Economy (CUP, 2013) 177; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘International Regulation 
without International Government: Improving International Organization Performance through 
Orchestration’ (2010) 5 The Review of International Organizations 315. 
28 See the overview of the debate in Fransen and Burgoon, above n 10, with further references. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Macdonald, above n 27, 184. 
31 Locke, above n 27, 177. 
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regulation and non-state private governance schemes work together. In 
particular, there is still much need for empirical work on how public and private 
governance interact32 and what kind of regulatory instruments are effective in 
enhancing CSR in supply chains. The legal analysis of CSR in the governance 
of global supply chains has much potential to contribute to this debate by 
identifying ways in which the impunity of the lead firms — the transnational 
corporations at the top of the chain — can be removed if and when core CSR 
principles in their supply chains are violated by their suppliers and their sub-
suppliers. 
III EMPIRICAL DATA: THE CSR SUPPLY CHAIN POLICIES 
OF DAX30 COMPANIES SHOW ‘BUSINESS AS USUAL’ 
This Part analyses publicly available information about the supply chain 
policies of the top 30 listed German companies (the so-called ‘DAX 30’). This 
dataset provides support to the argument that stringent legal regulation of CSR 
in global supply chains is needed.  
The data were gathered as part of a compliance transparency rating of the 
DAX30 to which the author of this article contributed.33 The rating involved an 
assessment of publicly available documents of these 30 companies. The 
documents related to several compliance-relevant issues, and included the 
supplier code of conduct (a key component in the overall rating), the company 
code of conduct, and information about the compliance management systems.34 
The data were retrieved from the companies’ websites, for example from 
subpages on supply chain responsibility. 
The data provide an up-to-date picture of the way in which these large 
companies deal with their supply chains in the present regulatory environment 
which, by and large, still leaves it to the companies to decide whether and, if 
so, in what way, they promote CSR in their supply chains. The supplier codes 
of conduct (or, in the absence of the codes, the information the companies 
published online about their supply chain responsibility) were assessed using 
the following six criteria. First, was the supplier code of conduct based on 
                                                 
32 See Fransen and Burgoon, above n 10, 8. 
33 The rating was organised and published by the German investor magazine Fuchsbriefe. The 
author of this article was part of a jury of four experts who contributed to the volume. See Ralf 
Vielhaber (ed), Das Compliance-Rating der DAX-Unternehmen 2017 (Dr Hans Fuchs GmbH, 
2017). 
34 The data were retrieved in July 2017. The other categories were (based on an external view): 
code of conduct, an assessment of the compliance management system, declaration of 
compliance with the corporate governance code, risk analysis and dealing with scandals 
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international conventions such as the UN Global Compact,35 and how recently 
was the code established/updated? Second, which topics did the code cover (for 
example, human rights, bribery, health and safety in the workplace, freedom of 
association, forced labour, or environment) and in which languages was the 
code available? Third, how binding or vague were the provisions concerning 
the different issues? Fourth, were audit mechanisms included that were 
intended to ensure compliance by the suppliers with the CSR provisions (for 
example, self-audits, third party audits, or certifications)? Also, was there a 
whistleblower system for reporting violations of the code? Fifth, were there 
provisions regarding sub-suppliers? Sixth, did consequences follow from a 
violation and, if so, what were they?36 
The empirical data showed a rather mixed result in terms of the way these top 
30 listed German companies were dealing with CSR in their supply chain 
policies.37 The majority of these companies tended to have a rather 
unsatisfactory approach towards CSR in their supply chain and very few 
companies displayed ‘best practice’ approaches. Some companies made only 
very limited material about CSR in their supply chain available. Rather 
surprising for companies of this size and annual turnover, six of the DAX30 
companies did not even publish their supplier code of conduct.38  
Most companies gained an average score of 15–20 out of 30 available points, 
meaning that, at best, their supplier code of conduct could only be considered 
to be average.39 In many instances, their supplier code was found to be deficient 
for one or more of the following key reasons: the provisions were vague and 
indefinite; little information (if any) was provided about monitoring 
mechanisms (such as self-audits or third-party audits); little information was 
provided about sanctions; and in many cases almost no information was 
provided about dealings with sub-suppliers. In most cases, no reference was 
                                                 
35 The UN Global Compact contains ten principles on human rights, labour standards, 
environmental protection and fighting corruption. It was launched in September 2000 by the 
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Members of the UN Global Compact are corporations, 
employers’ organisations, trade unions, state institutions and civil society organisations. More 
information can be found at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/>. 
36 See for the whole assessment: Das Compliance-Rating der DAX-Unternehmen 2017 (Dr Hans 
Fuchs GmbH, 2017). 
37 See, for a brief overview of the results, Georgina Prodhan, ‘Siemens Best in German DAX for 
Compliance, Vonovia Worst — Study’ (Reuters, 30 August 2017) <https://www.reuters. 
com/article/germany-companies-compliance/siemens-best-in-german-dax-for-compliance-
vonovia-worst-study-idUSL8N1LG52K>. 
38 These companies were, inter alia, Fresenius SE, ProSieben and Lufthansa. 
39 A maximum of five points could be achieved for each of the six categories regarding the supply 
chain. 
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made to a whistleblower protection system for the supply chain. That means 
that it is doubtful whether employees of suppliers are able to anonymously raise 
concerns about, for example, labour standards at supplier factories.  
The limitation of the above analysis is the fact that only publicly available 
documents were accessed and examined. It is therefore possible that the 
companies do have better policies and mechanisms in place on these issues. 
However, one would usually expect companies that are part of the top 30 listed 
companies to publicise their CSR activities as this would enhance their 
reputation and thus give them a competitive advantage.  
Further key deficiencies of the supplier codes of conduct were their often rather 
aspirational wording and a failure to deal with the way in which the CSR 
principles were addressed further down the chain by sub-suppliers. Legally, the 
privity of contract doctrine means that contract law only binds direct suppliers 
of Western transnational corporations.40 Nevertheless the buyer at the top of the 
chain — through setting the tone regarding the handling of CSR — affects the 
governance of CSR in the sub-supply chain. Arguably, given their bargaining 
power in many supply chains, Western transnational corporations at the top of 
the chain are able to achieve meaningful behavioural change throughout their 
entire supply chain despite the limitations imposed by the privity of contract 
doctrine.  
In summary, the picture that emerges from these empirical data is that, from an 
outside perspective, the supply chain policies of many DAX30 companies 
appear to be deficient, especially in regard to the issues of monitoring, 
enforcement, and the CSR of sub-suppliers. The approach of many companies 
seems to be patchy, incoherent and soft-touch. This result is rather surprising, 
not only because global supply chains have been in the public spotlight for 
several years now, but also because there is increasing pressure on governments 
to address these issues through legislation. The findings hint at a situation where 
many leading companies appear to be treating CSR in their supply chain with 
a ‘business as usual’ approach. This means commitment on paper, but a lack of 
enforcement in practice. The empirical data of this study therefore further 
support the widespread criticism that the private governance mechanisms of 
transnational corporations, aimed at improving CSR in their supply chain, often 
fail to achieve their aims. They therefore support the argument that it is time 
for legislative intervention to impose CSR in supply chains. 
                                                 
40 See Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 8th ed, 2009) 110; Neil Andrews, 
Contract Law (CUP, 2nd ed, 2015) 175. 
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IV THE DEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORK: A SOFT 
APPROACH TO PROMOTING CSR IN SUPPLY CHAIN 
GOVERNANCE 
The recent trend in home states of transnational corporations towards legally 
regulating CSR in global supply chains is motivated by a number of factors 
such as the absence of a binding international human rights framework 
governing transnational corporations.41 The home states of transnational 
corporations could potentially have a significant effect on supply chain 
practices worldwide, with the largest businesses being concentrated in a few 
countries. In the year 2014, 419 of the Fortune Global 500 Companies had their 
headquarters in just 10 countries including the United States (128), China (95), 
Japan (57), France (31), Germany (28) and the United Kingdom (28).42 It can 
therefore be argued that the recent legislation on CSR issues in global supply 
chains in countries such as France or the United Kingdom has the potential to 
promote more responsible supply chains throughout the world.43 At the time of 
writing, further laws are in the legislative process in Switzerland and the 
Netherlands.44  
                                                 
41 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: 
Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation’ (2012) 22(1) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 145, 148. 
42 Bloomberg BNA (15 December 2014) Daily Tax Report, ‘The Changing Headquarters 
Landscape for Fortune Global 500 Companies’ <http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/EY-the-changing-headquarters-landscape-for-fortune-global-500-companies/$ 
FILE/EY-the-changing-headquarters-landscape-for-fortune-global-500-companies.pdf>. 
43 See, for a discussion of the increasingly legal nature of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Reginee Pillay, The Changing Nature of Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR and 
Development in Context — The Case of Mauritius (Routledge, 2015); Adaeze Okoye, Legal 
Approaches and Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a Llewellyn’s Law-Jobs Approach 
(Routledge, 2017); Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP, 2007). 
44 In 2015, a coalition of Swiss civil society organisations launched a public initiative to hold 
Swiss companies to account for human rights abuses committed abroad. They proposed a law 
which requires Swiss-based companies to carry out human rights due diligence for all of their 
business relationships. Under the proposed law, companies would be liable for damage caused 
by companies under their control unless they could prove that they had carried out appropriate 
due diligence to avoid the harm. See N Bueno, ‘The Swiss Popular Initiative on Responsible 
Business’ in Enneking et al (eds), Accountability and International Business Operations 
(Routledge, forthcoming 2019) <http://www.bhrinlaw.org/bueno_2018.pdf>. The lower house 
of the Dutch Parliament adopted a law in 2017 (referred to as the ‘Child Labour Due Diligence 
Law’) which requires companies to determine whether child labour exists in their supply chains 
and set out a plan for combatting it. This law is still awaiting approval by the Senate; see MVO 
Platform, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about the new Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law’, 
<https://www.mvoplatform.nl/en/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-new-dutch-child-
labour-due-diligence-law/>. See also the expert report for German law: Remo Klinger et al, 
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The existing laws on CSR in supply chain governance differ in terms of their 
level of stringency and regulatory technique. It can be argued that they can be 
seen as part of a continuum.45 Within that continuum, the soft end of the 
spectrum is represented by ‘soft disclosure’ laws such as the ‘transparency in 
supply chains’ clause in the United Kingdom.46 The middle ground of the 
continuum is covered by more prescriptive reporting regimes such as the US 
‘conflict minerals’ legislation,47 and the more stringent end is represented by 
liability-based laws such as the UK Bribery Act48 and duty-based approaches 
such as the French devoir de vigilance Act.49 It is beyond the scope, and is not 
the aim, of this article to assess all these different legislative interventions. 
Rather, a brief general critique will be made here as the basis for the main 
argument of the article, namely, that it is now time to pursue a hybrid regulatory 
approach towards promoting CSR in supply chains and to focus the debate on 
the question ‘what works?’ 
First of all, the problem with most of the existing laws on CSR in global supply 
chains is that they mandate primarily ‘light-touch’ reporting duties that leave 
much discretion to the companies as to the content of the reporting and the 
actual pursuit of CSR.50 One example of such an approach is section 54 of the 
UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 which contains a ‘transparency in supply chains’ 
clause. Subsection 4 of that section reads: 
A slavery and human trafficking statement for a financial year is — 
                                                 
Gutachten: Verankerung menschenrechtlicher Sorgfaltspflichten von Unternehmen im 
deutschen Recht (2016) <https://www.germanwatch.org/de/download/14745.pdf>. 
45 Rühmkorf, above n 16. 
46 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK) s 54(1). 
47 Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat 1376–2223. This section requires 
companies that use conflict minerals to file a report with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). This duty applies to listed US companies as well as foreign companies that 
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48 Bribery Act 2010 (UK) s 7(1). 
49 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des société mères et des 
entreprises donneueses d’ordre, JORF n°0074 du 28 mars 2017. 
50 See for a discussion of the transparency in supply chains clause in the UK Modern Slavery Act 
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‘The Efficacy of the Disclosure Requirement under s. 54 of the Modern Slavery Act’ (2018) 39 
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Rodríguez, ‘The Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU after Directive 
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(a) a statement of the steps the organisation has taken during the financial 
year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place— 
(i) in any of its supply chains, and  
(ii) in any part of its own business, or  
(b) a statement that the organisation has taken no such steps. 
On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that this clause requires very little of 
companies.51 Subsection 5 of that section contains a list of factors that a 
company may report about, including its due diligence mechanisms, but there 
is no requirement that such information be included in the slavery and human 
trafficking statement. In fact, the criticism can be raised that, prior to the 
enactment of this transparency legislation, most large companies already 
operated some CSR policy on forced and child labour and reported about this 
within their voluntary CSR/sustainability report. The fact that the reporting 
duty in the Modern Slavery Act does not require much specific substance in the 
slavery and human trafficking statement arguably leads to a situation where 
large companies can continue with their existing private governance approach 
to modern slavery in their supply chain. 
It is therefore doubtful whether the new statutory reporting duty will steer 
transnational corporations towards operating stronger CSR policies on modern 
slavery in their supply chain. This is particularly the case as this transparency 
clause even allows companies to report that they have not done anything. 
Moreover, the absence of key performance indicators and verification 
requirements, such as third party audits, turns this reporting duty effectively 
into a toothless instrument that is likely to achieve only little in terms of 
comparability and accountability.52 
Similarly, the recent EU Directive on nonfinancial information disclosure — 
often referred to as the ‘CSR Directive’ — is rather thin and soft on the issue 
of CSR in supply chains.53 Recital 6 of the Directive states that companies 
should refer to their supply and subcontracting chains ‘where relevant and 
                                                 
51 See, for example, Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rühmkorf, ‘The Domestic Politics of 
Corporate Accountability Legislation: Struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act’ 
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52 See LeBaron and Rühmkorf, above n 24. 
53 See for an analysis A Scheuch, ‘Soft Law Requirements with Hard Law Effects? The Influence 
of CSR on Corporate Law from a German Perspective’ in du Plessis, Varottil and Veldman 
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proportionate’,54 which shows a discretionary approach towards supply chain 
reporting. Although information on the company’s ‘due diligence processes’ is 
required, no more specific requirement is placed on companies as to what their 
reporting ought to contain and no verification of the reported information is 
required. In the UK, this soft approach to due diligence reporting becomes even 
more apparent when one considers that the government’s response to the 
consultation on the implementation of the Directive does not even once refer to 
due diligence.55  
Whilst the  corporate criminal liability for failing to prevent bribery by an 
‘associated person’56 that is provided for in the UK Bribery Act 2010 is a much 
more stringent form of supply chain governance, this law has, so far, not been 
used as a model for controlling other pressing CSR issues in supply chains, such 
as modern slavery.57 It is argued here that this is a missed opportunity as the 
Bribery Act indirectly imposes due diligence requirements on companies. 
Conducting due diligence is a way of showing that a company operates 
‘adequate procedures’ —  a defence to the criminal offence of not preventing 
an associated person from engaging in bribery.58 
More recently, the French devoir de vigilance legislation of 201759 has been 
embraced very positively by civil society as a legislative instrument that 
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Directive: The Government Response to the Consultation on Implementation of the Directive 
(November 2016).  
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Lords, Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Report 
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addresses CSR in supply chains.60 This French law is a ‘command and control’-
type legislation.61 The law requires France-based companies that have more 
than 5000 employees in France (including employees of French subsidiaries) 
or 10 000 employees worldwide (employed in both French and foreign 
subsidiaries) to establish a ‘plan of vigilance’. In this plan companies must 
identify risks of human rights, health and security or environmental violations 
that might arise from their business activities, as well as the activities of 
subsidiaries and companies that they control. The plan must also include the 
activities of suppliers and subcontractors with whom the company has an 
established commercial relationship. In addition to identifying the risks, the 
companies that are subject to this duty must also develop procedures for the 
evaluation of their business partners and their subsidiaries as well as undertake 
actions to mitigate risks and severe violations. The companies must also have 
mechanisms in place to ensure that they are alerted to violations of workers’ 
rights. The plan must be implemented ‘in an effective manner’ and be published 
in the management report of the company’s directors as well as be available to 
the shareholders at the annual general meeting. 
Whilst this duty of vigilance was held to be constitutional by the French 
Constitutional Court, the sanctions for a violation of it that were originally 
included in the law were not upheld by the Court.62 The sanctions included a 
penalty of up to 10 million Euros for companies that violated this duty. Liability 
was based on ‘fault’ by the company and a causal link between this fault and 
the loss, in accordance with general tort principles. A company that was held to 
be liable to victims could have been subject to a civil fine of up to 30 million 
Euros. Whereas the duties introduced by the law remain the same, the removal 
of the sanctions represents a significant reduction of the stringency of the law. 
While there is still a statutory expectation placed on companies as to how they 
should deal with CSR in their supply chains, there is now little that follows 
legally in the case of non-compliance. Still, even after the judgment of the 
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Constitutional Court, companies can be ordered by a court to publish, and to 
implement in an effective manner, their due diligence plan.63   
The requirements of the French law most closely resemble the concept of 
supply chain due diligence, as laid out in the UN Guiding Principles,64 as they 
mirror the different steps outlined in the Principles.65 It has been argued that the 
French devoir de vigilance law and the UN Guiding Principles ‘resonate 
strongly together’ and that it can be expected that the Guiding Principles will 
be used as a means to interpret the law’s requirements.66 A final notable point 
about the French law is that it is specifically about supply chain due diligence 
and that it covers a broad range of issues that companies need to address. This 
is different from the focus on one issue only, as exemplified in the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 (UK) and the Bribery Act 2010 (UK). 
On the whole, the present legislative approach towards CSR in supply chains is 
primarily focussed on reporting duties. However, these are predominantly laws 
that leave much discretion to the companies as to how they pursue CSR and to 
what extent they report about their CSR policies. It is therefore questionable to 
what extent these laws are able to steer transnational corporations towards 
operating more stringent CSR policies in their private governance relations with 
their suppliers. 
V PRIVATE-PUBLIC GOVERNANCE INTERACTION IN 
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN GOVERNANCE 
This developing regulatory framework appears to improve the status of CSR in 
supply chain governance by adding public governance mechanisms to protect 
it. However, the critical analysis of present legislative approaches towards 
regulating CSR in this article has shown that most of these laws are not very 
stringent and it is therefore unlikely that they will significantly impact on the 
way in which transnational corporations promote CSR in their supply chain 
relations. It remains to be seen what the real effects of the different pieces of 
legislation are. There is a genuine danger that soft reporting duties such as those 
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2018 GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN GOVERNANCE 79 
contained in the UK Modern Slavery Act enable companies to comply with the 
law with little additional effort. Similarly, it was shown in the discussion above 
that the recent EU Directive on nonfinancial information disclosure, which has 
just been implemented in Member States such as the UK and Germany, contains 
few requirements for reporting on supply chains. 
It is not suggested that reporting laws per se are unable to achieve greater 
corporate responsibility. There is much literature on the benefits of this 
communication-based regulatory technique, claiming, for example, that it 
‘regulate[s] behaviour by enriching the information available to the target 
audience’.67 The audience of the company reports can thus make informed 
choices such as whether or not to purchase goods of a particular company. In 
turn, such behaviour can further the objects underlying the CSR regulation, 
steering corporations towards assuming greater corporate responsibility in 
supply chains. It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with the 
advantages and disadvantages of transparency as a regulatory technique, but it 
is argued here that reporting laws are more likely to achieve their aim of 
steering corporate behaviour if the relevant reporting requirements are 
stringent. When companies have to provide facts and figures on key aspects of 
their supply chain, the reporting is likely to achieve more comparability and 
accountability.  
The argument that stringent public governance is likely to better steer 
corporations in their private governance is the subject of an article that the 
present author has recently co-authored. It contains a small-scale empirical 
assessment of supply chain documents of 25 FTSE100 companies.68 The 
documents that were assessed in that study included supplier codes of conduct, 
CSR/sustainability reports and, where available, the terms and conditions under 
which these companies purchased goods and services. The study analysed the 
way in which these 25 companies deal with the issues of forced labour and 
bribery in their supply chains. All companies are subject to the ‘transparency in 
supply chains’ clause in the UK Modern Slavery Act 201569 and the corporate 
criminal offence in the UK Bribery Act 2010.70 In brief, the main finding was 
that the way the companies deal with the two issues of bribery and forced labour 
appears to be hierarchical. Whereas bribery has clearly become a compliance 
issue (that is, companies appear to treat its prevention as a legal obligation that 
they need to comply with), this does not appear to be the case for forced labour. 
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It seems, from the documents that we assessed, that forced labour is being dealt 
with in a much less stringent manner by the companies than is bribery. We have 
therefore concluded that hard, stringent laws such as the UK Bribery Act spur 
deeper changes in the behaviour of transnational corporations than light-touch, 
transparency laws such as the UK Modern Slavery Act.  
VI THE WAY AHEAD: THE SEARCH FOR ‘WHAT WORKS’ 
IN A HYBRID SYSTEM OF CSR PROMOTION 
Following on from the critical assessment of the legislative status of ‘chain 
law’, this Part now looks at the way ahead for the legal regulation of CSR by 
home states. It will make three tentative suggestions for further development. 
First, it seems as if the present soft-touch reporting laws on CSR are not going 
to significantly impact on the private governance promotion of CSR by 
transnational corporations. In particular, it is doubtful that these laws will lead 
to companies operating stringent due diligence procedures on CSR vis-à-vis 
their suppliers. The simple legislative reference to due diligence processes, 
without a requirement that companies have the outcomes of their due diligence 
processes audited, is problematic. It means that companies can claim to operate 
such processes without having to prove this. Due diligence could thus 
effectively become a public relations concept in the sense that companies can 
publicly state that they would carry out due diligence for their supply chain in 
accordance with legislative requirements and thus create a positive business 
image without having to do much in order to comply with these laws. 
Second, it was argued above, in the discussion of existing theoretical framings 
of supply chain governance, that law now needs to be placed at the heart of the 
debates about CSR in supply chain governance. But, more than that, the focus 
needs to be on the interaction between public and private governance, and on 
the question ‘what works?’ The question needs to be how legal regulation can 
best steer the behaviour of transnational corporations so that they better use 
their bargaining power to require CSR of their suppliers? In order to answer 
this kind of question, empirical (legal) research is needed to assess how 
companies react to different forms of ‘chain law’. Such research can then help 
to identify examples of ‘best practice’ which can be used to inform legislators 
in other jurisdictions. Given the challenges for CSR in global supply chains, 
such legislative developments in the home states of transnational corporations 
are a good opportunity to better steer both buyer and supplier companies 
towards pursuing CSR. It is therefore important that the effects of existing 
legislative approaches are clear so that decisions made by companies are 
informed decisions.  
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Third, this article argues that the ‘multifaceted approach’71 that Locke suggests 
as part of the right mix between public and private governance must be based 
on a hybrid regulatory system.72 The reference to a hybrid regulatory system 
means a system in which private law, public law, soft law standards (developed 
by private actors as well as international organisations) and private regulation 
by and between companies, all interact with each other. Heldeweg notes that 
the characteristic feature of such a system is ‘a mix of origins’.73 Given the 
complexity of supply chain governance and the number of actors involved in 
those chains, it is unlikely that a single approach will be able to achieve the 
ultimate goal of making supply chains more economically, socially and 
environmentally responsible. However, such a hybrid system needs stringent 
legal regulation in order to promote the pursuit of CSR in the supplier relations 
of transnational corporations. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article argues that it is high time for law to be put at the heart of discussions 
about CSR in global supply chains. The private governance approach has, so 
far, failed to lead to sustained improvements in CSR in these chains. The 
analysis of the supplier codes of conduct of the top 30 listed German companies 
(DAX30) shows that the majority of transnational corporations listed on the 
DAX seem to continue to apply a ‘business as usual’ attitude towards their 
supply chain. The ‘governance gap’ relating to supply chains means that 
transnational corporations often face little legal liability when CSR principles 
are violated in their supply chain. 
Given the recurrent reports of gross violations of CSR principles in global 
supply chains, the recent trend towards legislative intervention by the home 
states of transnational corporations is, in principle, to be welcomed. Home state 
legislation (public governance) has the capacity to induce the use of private 
governance by companies at the top of supply chains. However, most of the 
existing legislation, such as the transparency in supply chains clause in the UK 
Modern Slavery Act 2015, lacks stringency. It does not require much more from 
companies than what many leading listed companies are already doing on 
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reputational grounds. The danger of this situation is that companies can operate 
a ‘business as usual’ approach whilst meeting legal regulations. 
Such a situation is, in some ways, even worse than the present situation. 
Transnational corporations can try to prevent negative publicity by reference to 
their compliance with the relevant laws. It is therefore necessary that laws are 
passed that have the capacity to meaningfully change the behaviour of buyers 
in supply chains vis-à-vis their suppliers. Such laws should build on the strong 
bargaining power that many transnational corporations have. It is argued that 
stringent laws are more likely to induce companies to use this bargaining power 
for greater promotion of CSR. Research therefore now needs to focus on the 
issue of what kind of public governance instruments are best-placed to promote 
the use of private governance within a hybrid regulatory approach. Small-scale 
empirical research hints at the positive effects that more binding laws such as 
the UK Bribery Act have had on the way companies are dealing with this issue 
in their supply chain policies. The focus of the debate on supply chain 
responsibility should therefore now focus on the question ‘what works?’ 
